The Digital Television Revolution: Seizing the Means of Production or Just Switching Channels
Elizabeth
Rackley
Emory
University ,colaborador
de Sanz Comunicación e International leadership
Institute
While, previously, broadcasting traveled through satellites while digital computer signals trekked slowly through phone lines, presently a higher quality universal digital network, using television, computer, and telephone technology is under construction. Television's alliance with the world-wide computer communications system is an information age revolution either imperiling media mega-corporation dominance over production and consumption alike, or merely shifting power back and forth between Turner Enterprises and Microsoft. This analysis asks "Will American individuals rise up, and, in non-violent, entrepreneurial gestures, grab hold of the new enabling technology?". The state of the Internet may give us some optimism, as imaginative individuals working outside big communications corporations have made their marks, despite an overall complacency about the generally undemocratic nature of software control. Digital television's noblest promise is that, through a possible decentralization of the means of production and distribution, monopolistic networks and broadcasters will no longer dictate to viewers what to watch, when to watch it, and even how to watch it (if the word "watch" will even remain always appropriate when discussing our relationship to television).
When trans-global programming, produced by persons as well as corporations, is located on servers and suggested on electronic menus and can be downloaded at will, viewers will have access to indeterminate possibilities. That is, they will be able to consume and produce programming that revolves around their specific interests and perhaps even reflects their particular values. This paper finds that these and other innovations in television, however, pose certain vaguely discernible threats. The anticipation of a communications system driven by individual, rather than market, interest is, in actuality, utopian: the new technologies have, like all previous technologies, the opportunity of being commercialized; for example, as privacy decreases with computerized information tracking, advertisers' ability to scrutinize viewers' personal tastes and buying habits will increase. Another, less conspicuous, risk resides in a quality of isolation that highly fragmented programming may usher in: television precisely tailored to the individual could bring about a social and cultural balkanization. While a global entertainment and information system links the world, a still unprecedented postmodernity in communications may paradoxically splinter it. At its most revolutionary, this critique of digital television asks if a society that stays together because it watches TV sitcoms together is worth preserving anyway.
At this moment, the computer revolt has modified the way most Americans receive or deliver information domestically; however, television, beyond radio, magazines, newspapers, film, and computers, is still the preeminent mechanism by which mass media exists. While the Internet has been expanding its domain exponentially to include more and more sites, television has been increasing its available channels. In a revolutionary converging of the two mediums, however, televisions are being modified to house electronics that make them internally like multimedia PCs but externally no different (Rheingold 15). The result, beyond the current WebTV, will be a tremendously influential television superhighway that provides Internet access and particular programming for particular individuals, with full 2-way interactive service capabilities.
Interactive TV as it exists at present, in the form of on-line opinion polls, e-mail viewer response, and "dense screen" chat-lines like the one that MTV broadcasts overtop videos, is a novelty at present, but, its banality might persuade some to regard the whole project as unimpressive. As the alternative distribution system gets current programming out through this new conduit, it will begin to develop other channels that distinguish it from cable operators. No one is quite sure what the new digital programming will look like, however. Intel's Andy Grove complains that "It's like a soapy elephant-slippery and big" (98). With new capabilities will come applications that are bizarre, if not grotesque: Bill Gates suggests a function that allows you to run a version of Gone With the Wind with your head on Scarlett or Rhett's body (Levy 56). Another unpromising proposal is to have Web users spontaneously write shows as actors read their lines from teleprompters (Brant).
The form interactive television will probably take most successfully, other than as an Internet provider, is that of traditional programming marketed, selected, and broadcast around individual taste. Televisions aren't necessarily appliances that operate upon entirely passive viewers; but, they are at least less interactive than PCs. In the next decade, however, TV shows will be "posted" or broadcast at scheduled times but will be available to the isolated viewer at any time during the week prior to the following posting date (Brant interview). Viewers can still feel part of a television community by tuning in to shows in tandem with a larger public or they may decide from lists of shows at times convenient to them alone. They can also pause, forward, or rewind at will.
Innovations like Starsight or Intel's Selection Recognition Agent, which electronically keep tabs on their preferences and pre-selects programming that they will supposedly find gratifying, will mediate the sense of choice that people will gain, however. These software applications generate hyperlinks between information on home units and relevant applications. By recognizing previous broadcast choices, along with URLS, email addresses, and keywords, it can supposedly detect what your likely interests are, what those of your friends and colleagues are, etc. Being apprised of their viewing habits and personal associations, viewers' television systems will nominate this or that show to send them through cyberspace. It is easy to see why such a monitoring device may leave one feeling gravely paranoid.
The individual is right to panic over a loss of privacy, privacy being the principle casualty of the technological revolution. Networks will certainly capitalize on this software because it will enable them to receive instant and wholly accurate ratings, and avoid the imprecise Nielson process. Networks will, in turn, vend out these figures to advertisers willing to pay sizable fees for them, who will then target their commercials to the viewer's specific demographic group (Rheingold 293). A college student watching ER may see commercials for Budweiser and Domino's, and movie trailers, while a middle-aged mother of two watching the same show might see spots for Isuzu Trooper and Martha Stewart paint. It is likely that, in an unprecedented incursion into Americans' private lives, networks and advertisers will soon know viewers' ages, phone numbers, general daily schedules, credit card and social security numbers, if they don't already (Shapiro 12). Further, entrepreneurs have joined the data-collection industry and new avenues are being paved for commodifying what should be confidential material; consequently, the communications system is simply too widespread and too complex for the government to effectively, and unconditionally, regulate it.
There are some identifiable political and societal boons to digital television, however. While TV has traditionally worked to standardize speech patterns, collective social memory, and cultural imagery, digital TV may help to reestablish complexity in American identity. When the new technology disseminates broadcast control to an increased degree among the people themselves, there will be more opportunities for television that is activist, educational, and culturally sensitive in spirit. For example, Native American leaders currently see the Internet as a tool by which 500 Indian nations may experience pantribal culture--to observe other tribes' handicrafts, dance, food preparation, and political seminars--on a regular basis (Martin 117). Other communities who have made use of the Internet include environmentalists, consumer groups, educators, etc. It is likely that such coalitions will find inroads into television to promote their agendas, as computer users in the future will be able to produce their own TV shows using digital cameras and home PCs. Though it will cost to own such PC and digital camera equipment, the change will vastly improve the chances that small interest groups will be able to broadcast nationally. They will at least no longer have to go begging to monolithic networks. It seems fair to conjecture then that increased access to multi-media will lead to new forms of participation and democratic representation, creating more awareness of particular and multiple cultural and political identities.
While television becomes tailored to individual taste with "limited appeal" shows like Native American programming, however, media will become even more splintered and the mass quality of communication will diminish. Television viewers will likely divide themselves into virtual audiences, as Web users have developed into virtual communities over the past few years; though these communities intersect in time and space unendingly. Technological bridges have allowed for the proliferation of virtual sub-cultures created by on-line citizens who otherwise would never have met one another. The same sort of technology will allow television audiences to stay within a preferred niche, and avoid exposure to images not of interest to them. It may be then that as virtual audiences expand, other communities may diminish. The result is an enhanced postmodern reality.
These technological advances may encourage multiculturalism, democracy, and the valuing of diversity; or, the changes will bring about insularity and discourage dialogue. What really is at risk, though, if Americans lose the shared experience of television? Truthfully, the conversation that we, as American television audience members, are engaged in is simply not that interesting. If Americans find amity in shared Jennifer Anniston haircuts, Seinfeld jokes, and annual Oscar events, then our unity is hollow anyway.
Further, as home Internet use increases, via television and remote keyboards, users will hopefully spend their time more productively. The impact that convergence will likely have on Internet quality is one serious drawback, however. Though television will definitely improve its range of applications, the Internet as we know it will likely deteriorate from its largely text-based, highly interactive form to a more graphics-heavy, user-friendly medium. To lure everyone with a TV set to try the new digital technology, companies such as NetChannel are studying how to make the changes appealing to sluggish couch potatoes. Wary of intimidating techno-phobic consumers, the companies' advertising message to the public will be that this technology, like traditional television, provides simple, mindless entertainment. Their message, unfortunately, will likely be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Clynch Salley, a NetChannel (NC) executive, says "The NC platform is a way to democratize database technology a little bit" (Hernandez 6); and in capitalist society "democracy" can be mistaken for mediocrity.
In order to be a real tool of democracy, it is true that the new medium must be accessible to all citizens. It is fair to assume that once fully developed, the television communications system will be somewhat affordable, otherwise it would collapse under its own weight. It can be understood this way: if interactive television was only available to the wealthy, then advertising would not be able to support it; whereas if all spending blocks were connected then the system would thrive. Bill Gates says, "The information highway is a mass phenomenon or it is nothing" (64); though Bill Gates will remain a billionaire participant while the poor will remain poor participants. Further, ownership of the technologies will remain monopolistic. For example, the Justice Department recently gave Microsoft the green light to purchase WebTV, despite anti-trust violation suspicions. Consequently, competitors like Tele-TV and NetChannel legitimately fear that Microsoft will dominate the new communications technology as they have the old.
On a world-wide scale, though rich countries will construct the computer-television infrastructure for their own interests, poorer nations will receive this technology at a more moderate cost. This technology-sharing, however, deserves scrutiny. To understand what can happen, it may be helpful to look at an example of how assistance in building free television was beneficial to a politically troubled country, but, at the same time, raised ethical concerns (Meier 91). Russia's Independent Broadcasting System, the IBS, also called Internews, is the innovation of Californian David Hoffman, a fund-raiser and political activist who has been creating media bridges with Russia since before the cold war ended. The IBS is not under Kremlin control; therefore, should the communists ever try to shut down television in a take-over attempt again, they won't find it so easy.
It's not a single switch any more...Now there are all these regional networks with their own TV towers and transmitters It's no longer a case of one guy in Moscow making all the calls. (quoted in Meier 93-4)
Hoffman has garnered multimillion-dollar investments from The Agency for International Development, and about fifteen private agencies, to create the IBS. The US, and Hoffman, are, however, serving their own interests as they permeate Russian communications: this US government foreign aid has gone towards not just establishing "sustainability" and democracy in the former Soviet territory, but also towards cultivating a mighty advertising sector (Meier 90). However, Meier explains "IBS is more a grass-roots consortium than a traditional Western broadcasting company of owned and operated affiliates" and it is, ironically, more democratic for that reason (Meier 92).
Elsewhere, in Bosnia, the Internet has displayed its utility in the struggle against totalitarianism. When, in 1996, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic shut down Radio B92, a non-government-controlled organization that was reporting student protests, the broadcasts went out over the Internet, leading the students to name their movement "The Internet Revolution" (Bennahum 124).
These cases may give us insight into the efficacy of digital television in promoting democracy across the world, or the role that the technological revolution will have in political revolutions. When a great portion of the world is connected to a more interactive system than their televisions have previously allowed, more people will have freedom to seek news and entertainment unhindered by government control. One will not have to own a PC to find information unmediated by networks, major news media operations, government spokespersons, politicians, etc.; they can accomplish this with a set-top box or a digitized television. Also, programming from all over the world will become more accessible than it ever has been, whether one chooses to take advantage of it or not.
There is no doubt that people interacting in cyberspace will look for ways to access wealth and power, though the technology may also circumvent the continuation of old or development of new governments with totalitarian control over media. Regardless, wealth and power remain a force behind any new technology, as individuals and corporations search for new technical and infrastructional "solutions." Though many of us still dread the changes of such a radical technological shift, the change will still come as long as markets can expand and profits can be made. On the consumer end, even if some resist change, others, young people especially, will be expecting interactivity, especially if that interactivity means greater convenience.
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